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Introduction
The debate for a two state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has
been ongoing for decades. However, given the current circumstances and
realities on the ground, this approach has become more implausible with each
passing day. Therefore, many have come to argue the real solution would be a
single state that would afford equal rights for both Israeli and Palestinian
citizens regardless of ethnicity, religion, or racial background.
Considering the troubled history of the region, many would view a state
where Israelis and Palestinians living together, sharing land, and engaged in a
peaceful democratic process to be an unattainable fantasy. This paper does not
purport that a single state is a guaranteed solution to the problem. Rather, it
attempts to show that a one state solution is the most practical and pragmatic
approach for a peaceful resolution. The one state solution is not necessarily
what both parties are willing to accept, but considering the circumstances it is
an alternative proposal which at the very least must be acknowledged,
discussed, and examined. This proposal is not about what can be solved in the
present, but rather what can be achieved in the future. Taking into account the
current political climate, it would be irrational to believe creating a single state
would automatically unite Jewish and Arab citizens and erase over half a
century of troubled history. But what a secular, non-sectarian, democratic
state can do is begin to lay a workable political framework for the next
generation of Israelis and Palestinians. Hopefully, this study will add positively
1

to the discourse in better explaining and understanding the task which lies
ahead.
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Research Design and Methodology
This paper will adopt a mainly qualitative, historical approach in addition
to using various theories to support the study. In essence, this project is about
policy; both those adopted by the Israeli state as well as the Palestinian
government. For the research, a variety of sources will be used including
books, journals, official government documents, and periodicals. It must be
noted there are certain limits to the study, since the issue being dealt with is
primarily an optional approach based on several varying factors and
circumstances. What is being discussed is not a documented historical event,
but rather a pragmatic proposal for a future resolution. Rather than examining
a historical event, the study will seek to examine and analyze this future
proposal within a historical context using the past as a reference for the
feasibility and possibility of a one-state solution. In the interest of clarification,
the terms bi-national state, single-state solution, and one-state solution all
refer to the same concept and are used interchangeably.
In order to test the validity of the hypothesis of a one-state solution, a
variety of issues and elements pertaining to the situation must be rigidly
explained and analyzed. This paper will follow a decidedly pragmatic approach
focusing on the possibility for a one-state solution, rather than taking a moral
or ethical stance for or against either side of the debate. All of the topics
addressed will directly relate to the concept of the one-state solution. Some of
the topics that will be discussed include the following : the foundations of the
3

Israeli state; individual and group decision making by important and influential
figures throughout the conflict; issues of cultural and national identity in
Israeli and Palestinian societies; the nature of domestic politics; the status of
the city of Jerusalem; the issue of Palestinian refugees; Israeli settlements and
the Separation Wall built in Palestinian territories; Arabs citizens of Israel; the
role of water as a valuable resource; the problem of demographics; the example
of past conflicts and models applicable to the study; the failure of the two-state
solution; and finally the advantages and potential problems a single state poses
for both Israelis and Palestinians.
In addition to these fundamental issues, numerous others will be
discussed and examined all within the framework or context in judging
whether a one state solution would be the most practical. Once again, it must
be reiterated that a one state solution is not a guaranteed remedy to the
conflict. Any resolution would be a daunting obstacle. But considering the
circumstances, a secular, democratic state for two peoples seems to be the only
logical alternative to end the years of stalemate and violence.

4

Review of the Literature
On November 29, 1947, the United Nations passed General Assembly
Resolution 181 which called for the partition of Palestine. The resolution was a
culmination of more than fifty years of Zionist attempts to establish a Jewish
homeland in historic Palestine. The dream of an independent, Jewish state was
finally realized when David Ben-Gurion declared Israeli independence on May
14, 1948. The United Nations created the Special Committee for Palestine,
UNSCOP, to be entrusted with carrying out the partition. Under the partition,
the Jewish people would receive approximately fifty-five percent of the land of
historic Palestine, while the remaining forty-five percent would be allocated to
the indigenous, Palestinian Arabs. Though the partition plan was approved by
the Jewish side, the Palestinian Arabs rejected it on the grounds partition
would deprive them of land rightfully theirs and would essentially spell the end
of a future, independent Palestinian state. As Ilan Pappe notes, “It is clear that
by accepting the Partition Resolution, the UN totally ignored the ethnic
composition of the country’s population. Had the UN decided to make the
territory the Jews had settled on in Palestine correspond with the size of the
future state, they would have entitled them to no more than ten percent of the
land.”1 This would be one of the first times, but certainly not the last time, that
Palestinian aspirations would be cast aside and ignored.

1

Pappe, Ilan. (2006). The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Oxford, England. Oneworld Publications Limited. Pg 31.
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The idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine was first openly
discussed at the First Zionist Congress held in Basel in 1897. Led by Theodore
Herzl, the objective of the Congress was to, “create for the Jewish people a
home in Palestine secured by public law.”2 Herzl, considered the father of
political Zionism, was not necessarily interested in Judaism or Jewish affairs,
but was motivated by his belief that assimilation into Western society and
growing anti-Semitism required Jews obtain a state of their own. According to
Avi Shlaim, “The Zionist Movement thus displayed two features that were to be
of fundamental and enduring importance in its subsequent history: the nonrecognition of a Palestinian national entity, and the quest for an alliance with a
great power external to the Middle East.”3 Almost all of the early Zionist
leaders, such as Herzl, Chaim Weizmann, Vladimir Jabotinsky, and David BenGurion, regardless of their political leanings, were in agreement a Jewish state
could not survive without the protection and approval of the Great Powers. The
trend of continually allying the state with a major power is a pillar of Israeli
foreign policy that cuts across all party lines and continues to the present day.
At the time of World War I, Palestine was under a British mandate.
Continuous lobbying efforts were directed by the Zionists, especially Chaim
Weismann, towards the British to secure a guarantee a national homeland for
the Jews would be forthcoming. Eventually, their efforts would be successful
and in 1917 the Balfour Declaration was signed, which stated “his Majesty’s
2
3
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Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home
for the Jewish people.”4 Furthermore, the declaration went on to state, “that
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.”5 But taking into consideration
the entire Jewish population constituted some 56,000, or approximately ten
percent of the total, the Balfour Declaration’s promise not to impose on the
native population, namely Palestinian Arabs, could not be taken very seriously.
In fact, a simple analysis of the contents in the declaration would make it
perfectly clear Great Britain had neither the intention of protecting the political
rights of the Palestinians, nor was it too concerned about the future problems
which would be certainly be created by such a decision.
The events that followed the Balfour Declaration, namely the Second
World War and the subsequent massacre of six million European Jews, only
hastened the desire to create a national homeland for the Jewish people.
Jewish immigration to Palestine from all over the world had vastly increased,
and Palestinian uprisings in 1927 and 1936 placed both sides on an inevitable
collision course.6 The collision would come in the year of 1948 when Israel
would declare its independence as a sovereign state.
The concept of a one state solution is not a relatively new proposal, but
support for it has emerged more strongly in the past decade. Even before the
4

Long, David. Reich, Bernard. (1995). The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa. Boulder,
Colorado. Westview Press Inc. Pg. 240-241.
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inception of the state of Israel, there were many Jewish and Palestinian
intellectuals who called for a single state that afforded equal rights to all its
inhabitants. Prominent Jews like Judah Magnes, Martin Buber, and Hannah
Arendt staunchly opposed partition, arguing that partition would inevitably
lead to conflict between the two communities.7 Martin Buber, who had left
Germany for Palestine in 1938, proclaimed the creation of Jewish majority
would lead to “war- real war- with our neighbors, and also with the whole Arab
nation: for what nation will allow itself to be demoted from the position of
majority to that of a minority without a fight?”8
It is important to further analyze Buber’s comments for a variety
reasons. First, it acknowledges the fact before the state of Israel came into
existence Jews were the minority, constituting approximately one-third the
entire population of Palestine in 1947.9 Secondly, it banishes the myth made
by many early Zionists violence between Jews and Arabs was avoidable if Arabs
had accepted the United Nations decision to partition Palestine between the
two peoples. No country or people would willingly accept a forced resolution
that would cede land rightfully belonging to them to another group of people.
Thus, war and conflict between the two sides was an inevitability that could
not be avoided. As early Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion noted, “Let us not
ignore the truth among ourselves ... politically we are the aggressors and they
7

Abunimah, Ali. (2006). One Country A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse. New York, New York.
Metropolitan Books. Pg. 105-106.
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York. Oxford University Press. Pg. 223.
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defend themselves... The country is theirs, because they inhabit it, whereas we
want to come here and settle down, and in their view we want to take away
from them their country.”10 These two points illustrate the fact many Jews
believed partition to be a grave error not only because it would lead to an
endless conflict between the two peoples, but it would also create a great
injustice for the Palestinian inhabitants of the land.
For the Palestinian people, the concept of a single state was
understandably much harder to acknowledge and accept. It was after all, their
land that was partitioned, and they believed a great injustice was being
committed against them. It was not until the 1960’s when some Palestinians
began calling for a single state solution. By this time, the Six Day War had
taken place and Israel had conquered the remaining Palestinian territories. The
Palestinian call for a single state solution to the conflict was based on two key
factors. First, the defeat of Arab forces in the wars of 1948 and 1967 had left
the Palestinians in an extremely weak position. Israel had emerged as the
vastly superior power in every respect. By 1967, Israel had become,
unacknowledged at the time, a nation in possession of nuclear weapons and
had the backing of major powers such as the United States, France, and Great
Britain. Realistically, The Palestinians understood competing militarily and
politically with the Israelis was a losing proposition, therefore, other
alternatives had to be analyzed and explored.

10
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The second reason some Palestinians began calling for a single state was
the fact that Israel’s continued existence was becoming a reality even the most
optimistic Palestinian could not deny. As a leader of the PLO’s prevailing Fatah
faction observed, “there is a large Jewish population in Palestine and it has
grown considerably in the last twenty years. We recognize that it has the right
to live there and that it is part of the Palestinian people. What we want to
create in the historical borders of Palestine is a multiracial democratic state… a
state without any hegemony, in which everyone, Jew, Christian, or Muslim will
enjoy full civic rights.”11 Due to continuous pressure from the international
community and the weakness of their political and military position,
Palestinian leaders had no choice but to accept partition and enter into
negotiations with their Israeli counterparts.
For the next few decades after 1967, the calls for a single state for two
peoples virtually disappeared from the political discourse. Israel which had
emerged as the dominant power in the conflict, and in fact the entire region,
was content on maintaining the status quo regarding the Palestinian question.
For their part, the Palestinians had further deteriorated into a fractured
movement forced into accepting positions according to the impulses of the
international community and Israel. At that point, the only things left to the
Palestinians were the historical injustice of their cause, and the fact
international law was on their side. Since the late 1980’s, the official PLO
position has been the adoption of the two-state solution with the independent
11
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states of Israel and Palestine coexisting side by side. Initially, the Israelis had
rejected any notion of a Palestinian state, claiming all the land as an integral
part of Eretz Israel (Greater Israel) which would remain undivided. However,
the Israeli position began to gradually change due to pressure from the
international community and the reality that “facts on the ground” were
making the situation untenable. Israel could no longer rely on its superiority to
maintain its more powerful negotiating position; it eventually had to address
the question of Palestinian self-determination.
It was not until after the failure of the 1993 Oslo Accords and
subsequent peace summits that the single state solution was beginning to once
again gain serious ground in the conversation. All meetings and summits
between Israeli and Palestinian officials since 1993 were based on the
proposition of a two-state solution. But in the last few decades since the Oslo
Accords, it has become more evident, considering the realities on the ground
that a two-state solution has become unworkable. Continued Israeli settlement
expansion, the rapidly growing population of Palestinians, Israeli intransigence
concerning the issues of refugees and the status of Jerusalem, and the fact
that a large portion of Israel’s fresh water supply lies in the Palestinian areas of
the West Bank (all pertinent issues to be discussed in detail later) make the
two-state solution an impractical proposal.
Thus, the calls for the abandonment of the two-state proposal in favor of
a single state for all peoples have gained more legitimacy especially in the last

11

decade. While some intellectuals, politicians, and academics from all ethnic
backgrounds and disciplines contend that a two state solution is no longer a
viable option considering the present circumstances, others argue that a onestate solution is simply fantasy with no real possibility of success or
implementation. The late NYU professor Tony Judt argues that the “two-state
solution is already doomed” because in the present times “Israel is truly an
anachronism. And not just an anachronism, but a dysfunctional one. In
today’s ‘clash of cultures’ between open, pluralist democracies and belligerently
intolerant, faith-driven ethno-states.”12 Former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem
Meron Benvinisti echoes these sentiments when he claims, “The conclusion is
that the seemingly rational solution of two states for the two nations can’t work
here. The model of a division into two-states is inapplicable. It doesn’t reflect
the depth of the conflict and doesn’t sit with the scale of the entanglement that
exists in large parts of the country.”13 And the late prominent Palestinian
intellectual and academic Edward Said made similar arguments when he
stated that, “Oslo [agreements] set the stage for separation, but real peace can
only come with a bi-national Israeli-Palestinian state.”14
On the other hand, there is also considerable reservation in the
applicability and viability of a single state for both peoples. Israeli historian Avi
Shlaim has warned that “a one state solution would institutionalize apartheid.
12
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It would be worse than South Africa under apartheid.”15 While Tel Aviv
university professor Carlo Stenger observes that, “As yet I have never seen a
credible blueprint for the one-state solution. Most Israeli Jews will insist that
the state have a Jewish character, but they can't explain how this character
can be maintained with democratic means, if there will be almost as many
Palestinian as Jewish citizens.”16 The variety of differing opinions highlight just
how difficult a solution acceptable to both sides will ultimately become and the
magnitude of the task which lies ahead.

15
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THE ONE STATE AGENDA
Since this study is based on a relatively recent concept, the proposal
deliberated in this paper relies considerably on the work of previous authors
and commentators. The majority of single state supporters proceed from three
basic assumptions. First, the present circumstances in the occupied
Palestinian territories cannot sustain a functioning, sustainable independent
state. Because of the ongoing construction of Israeli settlements and the fact
that the Palestinian areas of the West Bank and Gaza constitute two noncontiguous areas separated by an Israeli state, realistically speaking any future
Palestinian “state” would be nothing more than a series of cantons. In her book
The One-State Solution, Virginia Tilley strongly states, “The premise for all for
all present diplomacy- the two- state solution- has therefore become
impossible. The same reality confronts all parties involved: only one state can
viably exist in the land of historic Palestine between the Mediterranean and the
Jordan River.”17
Secondly, any independent Palestinian based on the current realities
would almost certainly be prone to economic and political instability. The
resulting state would be blocked off from the Israeli economy and its major
cities cut off from each other, making any meaningful trade or development
severely problematic and virtually impossible. Predictably, Israel could not be
17
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relied upon to support an independent Palestinian state, and for their part any
Palestinian government would attempt to distance itself from perceived Israeli
domination or interference in its economic affairs. A report in June 2011
issued by the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees places
unemployment in the West Bank and East Jerusalem between 25% and 27%.18
Additionally, the Palestinian Authority is heavily dependent on foreign aid and
donations totaling billions of dollars each year. Most significantly, there is a
heavy economic dependence on Israel, which according to the Palestinian
Authority’s Central Bureau of Statistics accounts for nearly 89% of PA exports
and 81% of its imports.19
Finally, supporters of the one-state solution make the argument a single
state would not be that far-fetched since Israeli-Palestinian coexistence was
put into effect when Israel conquered the remaining Palestinian territories in
1967. Despite Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005 and administrative
control being taken over by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, the
state of Israel still exerts complete military control over all the areas and
borders surrounding the territories. Israel reserves the right, and has exercised
that right on many occasions, to enter Palestinian territories under the
pretenses of Israeli national security. All imports and exports are monitored
and controlled by the Israeli government, and movement of people and goods is
18

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees. (2011). New UN research challenges
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19
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strictly controlled by the Israeli Defense Forces through a web of checkpoints,
barriers, and arbitrary closures spread throughout Palestinian areas. In a
report released in January 2008, Special Rapporteur John Dugard,
independent investigator on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the U.N. Human
Rights Council and professor of international law in South Africa concluded,
“Checkpoints and roadblocks seriously obstruct the freedom of movement of
Palestinians in the West Bank, with disastrous consequences for both personal
life and the economy. There are 561 such obstacles to freedom of movement,
comprising over 80 manned checkpoints and some 476 unmanned locked
gates, earth mounds, concrete blocks and ditches. In addition, thousands of
temporary checkpoints, known as flying checkpoints, are set up every year by
Israeli army patrols on roads throughout the West Bank for limited periods,
ranging from half an hour to several hours. In November 2007 there were 429
flying checkpoints.”20 Furthermore, Israel has never declared its borders and
does not officially accept the West Bank as occupied territory referring to the
area not as the West Bank, but by the biblical names of Judea and Samaria.
Under United Nations resolution 242, Israel’s annexation and seizure of the
West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem are deemed illegal under international
law.
Since the two-state solution has become almost impossible, Israel is
faced with a series of historical decisions in how best to deal with the

20
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Palestinian question. Essentially, Israel has three options it can take for finding
a resolution to the conflict. First, Israel can maintain the status quo by keeping
full control over all Palestinian territories it captured in 1967. But in doing so,
Israel risks the continued ire of the international community as well as the
struggle to maintain control over an occupied and restless Palestinian
population; a scenario very similar to the system that existed in South Africa
during the apartheid era.
The second option would be the forcible expulsion of Palestinians from
their lands to other states, mainly neighboring Arab countries. Though this
route is not supported by the majority of Israelis, it does garner considerable
support with far-right movements and politicians like Israeli Deputy Prime
Minister Avigdor Lieberman who has openly called for the expulsion of
Palestinians from Israel.21 As recently as April 2010, the Israeli government
enacted a law termed Military Order No. 1650 which states that any
“Palestinians, and any foreigners living in the West Bank, could be labeled
infiltrators and deported within 72 hours or jailed for seven years if they are
found without the correct permit. It does not define what Israel considers a
valid permit.”22 Because of the broad and ambiguous wording, many human
rights groups have condemned the law as an indiscriminate attempt at allowing
arbitrary population transfer directly contravening the edicts of the Fourth
21
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Geneva Convention which state, “Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well
as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of
the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are
prohibited, regardless of their motive.”23
The third alternative, which also serves as the basis for this study, is to
create a single state which would incorporate both Israelis and Palestinians in
an integrated, secular, democratic state. Admittedly, this one-state solution
raises immense political and social difficulties, mainly concerning the fate of
Israel as a “Jewish state” as well as the desire for Palestinians to reach
independent statehood. But a one–state solution cannot be dismissed, however
overwhelming the obstacles may appear, based on the reality no other practical
choice remains. Israeli policy over the last forty years has made an independent
Palestinian state a physical impossibility; there is only one state today in
historic Palestine. As University of Chicago professor and author of the Israel
Lobby John Mearsheimer correctly observes, “"A conversation about the twostate solution is meaningless, there's not going to be one. The Palestinians are
never going to get their own state. Instead there is going to be a Greater
Israel."24 In the subsequent chapters, an assortment of issues will be discussed
in detail relating to the possibility of success or failure for a one-state solution.

23
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Israeli Settlements
International law and the overwhelming majority of the international
community recognize that Israeli settlements are illegal. And as recently as
2004, the International Court of Justice has deemed the settlements to be in
breach of international law and the Fourth Geneva Convention, which explicitly
forbids any occupying power from transferring its own population to territories
it has occupied. It is widely recognized and accepted, even by Israel’s
staunchest ally the United States, that incessant settlement activity is a major
obstacle in achieving a peaceful resolution. Unfortunately, this has not stopped
the Israeli government from the ongoing and continuous building of
settlements on Palestinian land. In fact, since the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords
where Israel had promised to cease the building, the actual number of settlers
has approximately doubled from 300,000 to almost 550,000.25 In addition to
forcibly removing Palestinians from their lands to create these settlements, a
series of discriminatory policies has also been enacted to couple the seized
land. Many settlements are provided with a network of private roads which
strictly prohibit any Palestinians from using them, and Palestinian citizens are
deprived the right to access lands which contain olive trees and fruit groves;
lands that are sometimes the only means of sustenance and source of income
for these families. The land Israeli settlements are built on, in violation of
international law, is actually illegally confiscated Palestinian land supposed to
25
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serve as a future Palestinian state under prior agreements between Israeli
governments and Palestinian representatives. Thus, Israel is in serious
violation of Article 1 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because its
policy of settlements deprives Palestinians of the “fundamental right to selfdetermination” and under Fourth Geneva Convention Article 49 (f) which
states, “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own
civilian population into the territory it occupies.”26
Since the inception of settlement policy, Israeli attitudes have not
changed on the issue of settlements. Whether it is Labor, Likud, or Kadima
controlling the Israeli government, settlement policy remained the same;
continuous building and expansion of illegal housing to prevent any future
resolution which would require Israel to relinquish control over the occupied
areas. Commonly referred to as creating “facts on the ground”, this strategy
attempts to create an irreversible situation, which would alter the starting
point of any negotiations between the two sides. The settlements are essentially
colonies, some small others large, that are built on land seized by the
government. Like the South African system of designated “white only” areas,
these settlements are heavily fortified enclaves that restrict any Arab
Palestinians from living in them or even entering them. The overwhelming
majority of these settlements is built in the West Bank and enjoy private,
Jewish only roads with any Palestinians caught traveling along these
26
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settlement roads likely to be detained or even killed. All these settlements not
only enjoy unlimited usage of Palestinian land at their disposal, but the Israeli
government has a policy called “natural growth”, which refers to the continued
expansion of these settlements. This “natural growth” policy is done in a step
by step process allowing more and more Jews to live in these settlements, while
more and more Palestinians are pushed further away from their land. First, the
Israeli government seizes a considerable chunk of land from a Palestinian town
or village and closes it off from Palestinian inhabitants and owners under the
pretext of “security” reasons. Second, the government then brings a small
group of settlers to reside in this closed off area in small trailers park homes.
The government then supplies them with all the essential needs like water,
electricity, and year round military escorts. Third, the government then begins
replacing these small trailers with full-blown apartments and houses that allow
more settlers to come in and live, once again with the financial help of the
Israeli government. Finally, these settlements expand to such large sizes that
many have become huge cities. If one can pinpoint an exact reason why a twostate solution is unachievable then the issue of Israeli settlements would be
considered the primary reason.
Though Israeli settlement activity was vastly accelerated after the 1993
Oslo Accords, Israeli policy of building settlements on Palestinian land actually
began immediately after the Six Day War of 1967. After the conquest of
Palestinian territories, Israel’s deputy prime minister Yigal Allon put forth a
proposition to retain control over the Jordan Valley and West Bank, while
21

granting limited autonomy to Palestinian areas.27 Known as the Allon Plan, the
proposal had two distinct objectives it aimed to achieve. First, it ensured Israel
would maintain physical control over all occupied areas, thus setting the scene
for future Israeli expansion within Palestinian territories. And second, it
allowed the government of Israel to maintain control over the Palestinian
population without having to grant them any political rights or citizenship.
Doing so would mean Israel could relinquish responsibility for granting
Palestinians basic rights as well preserving Israel’s claim to being a Jewish
state through Jewish majority. As Israeli architect Thomas Leitersdorf , who
planned Israeli settlements in Jerusalem, explains, “The underlying political
idea was that the further inside the Occupied Territories we placed settlers, the
more territory Israel would have when the time came to set permanent
international borders [Israel still has not declared any borders] –because we
were already there.”28 In other words, the official Israeli plan on settlements
was meant to deliberately create a situation which would become irreversible
when the time came where either Israel was forced to declare its borders, or a
negotiated settlement with Palestinians was inevitable.
But if Israel’s earlier settlement policy was based on expanding borders
and considered a matter of national security, then its later phase took a much
more extremist, religious line. Beginning in the 1970s, an ultra-religious
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nationalist settler’s movement known as Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful),
began a campaign of accelerated settlement building throughout the entire
West Bank.29 Unlike the Allon Plan which was primarily based on national
strategic interests, this new settler movement was motivated by the belief it
was a divine right for Jews to possess all the land between the Mediterranean
Sea and the Jordan River. In turn, the Israeli government was explicit in its
support for these movements. Not only because it satisfied the state’s desire for
more land, but it also allowed the government to direct settler policy and
ensure all new settlements constructed would serve the state’s interests. In
fact, settlement activity is not only supported by the state it is actively
encouraged. As Segel and Weisman argue, “ What becomes evident is that by
placing settlers across the landscape, the Israeli government is not merely
utilizing the agencies of state power and control, namely, the police and army,
for the administration of power, but that it ‘drafts’ the civilian population to
inspect, control, and subdue the Palestinian population.”30 Furthermore,
Israelis are handsomely rewarded with a variety of subsidies meant to
encourage families to move into settlements. Because some West Bank
settlements are classified as priority developments by the Israeli state, settlers
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are eligible for generous benefits and tax breaks provided by six government
ministries.31
Part of the conventional wisdom has been that in order for Palestinians
to have an independent state, they would have to accept that large Israeli
settlement blocs were a fait accompli. But opinion polls show fewer than 4
percent of Palestinians in the occupied territories would accept such a
proposal.32 Israeli officials have repeatedly made the claim those larger
settlement blocs in the occupied territories like Ariel, Gush Etzion, Betar Illit ,
Ma’ale Adumim, Modiin Illit should simply be viewed as “neighborhoods” rather
than illegal settlements.33 These larger settlements are equivalent to small
cities with their own school systems, shopping malls, cinemas, parks, and
cultural and recreational centers. Removing them would not only be a major
physical obstacle, it would also take a herculean effort by Israeli politicians to
convince settlers and the Israeli public alike the benefit and practicality of
undertaking such a large scale effort. An effort, judging by Israel’s continued
construction of settlements throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem, no
politician or government is willing to make.

31

Makdisi. Saree. (2008). Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation. W. W. Norton &Company. New York. Pg.
125.
32

Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre. (June 2000). On Palestinian Attitudes towards Final Status
Negotiations and the declaration of the State. http://www.jmcc.org/Documentsandmaps.aspx?id=463.
33
Christian Science Monitor. (September 14, 2010). Five largest Israeli settlements: who lives there, and why.
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0914/Five-largest-Israeli-settlements-who-lives-there-andwhy/Ariel.

24

Another misguided belief by many supporters of the two-state solution is
the possibility Israel would be willing or is able to remove the settlements from
the West Bank and East Jerusalem, just as it did when Israel vacated all the
settlements from the Gaza Strip. In 2005, then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
decided to unilaterally disengage Israel from the territory of Gaza under the
stated purpose of national security, and as a show of Israel’s good faith
towards the creation of a future independent Palestinian state. But if Sharon’s
public declarations were meant for public consumption, then his true motives
for the disengagement were vastly different. Sharon’s plan was neither meant
to end the occupation nor was it meant to bring a permanent peace between
Israelis and Palestinians. The Gaza disengagement plan was actually a series of
decisions undertaken by the government mainly to tighten control over areas in
the West Bank and East Jerusalem.34
Disengagement from the West Bank would ultimately be an entirely
different matter from that of Gaza. First, unlike Gaza which had a settler
population of fewer than 9,000 and consisted of twenty one settlements, the
West Bank has a settler population of approximately 550,000 living in 121
settlements which control over 42 percent of the entire land in the West
Bank.35 Secondly, Gaza was an impoverished, vastly overcrowded, violent area
which served a far smaller interest for Israel to maintain in both political and
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economic terms. The West Bank is not only strategically important, because it
covers a large area constituting Israel’s eastern borders; it also serves as a
major source of Israel’s freshwater supply. Israel has no intention of
dismantling any settlements in the West Bank; on the contrary, Israel’s policy
aim has always been deepening the occupation and swallowing up of even more
Palestinian land, specifically to prevent any future peace proposals from forcing
Israel to relinquish any part it has deemed integral to the idea of a Greater
Israel. As Sharon’s close advisor and confidant Dov Weisglass so openly stated
the following:
The disengagement supplies the amount of formaldehyde that’s
necessary so that there will be no political process with the Palestinians. And
when you freeze that process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian
state, and you prevent a discussion on the refugees, the borders and
Jerusalem. Effectively, this whole package called the Palestinian state, with all
that it entails, has been removed indefinitely from our agenda. And all this with
authority and permission. All with a presidential blessing and the ratification of
both houses of Congress.36
The disengagement of Gaza was not meant to be a prelude to what could
possibly happen in the West Bank, but rather a deliberate effort on the part of
the Israelis to create such “facts on the ground” where the creation of a
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Palestinian state would be delayed to the point where a state could and would
never exist.
Another major issue of the conflict, that is no less important, but clearly
relevant is the access to freshwater resources. Though the Middle Eastern
region is known for its abundance of petroleum and natural gases, water is an
increasingly scarce and valuable resource. Israeli need for water is very high,
both for its economic and agricultural demands, and its desire to sustain a
Western like living standard for its population. But in the last few decades
Israel has had an increasing number of problems acquiring water resources.
Most of Israel’s freshwater is derived from the Sea of Galilee and a coastal
aquifer, but approximately a third of Israel’s resources comes from two large
aquifers, the Yarkom-Tanninim Aquifer in the west and the northern NablusGilboa Aquifer.37 Between the two aquifers, some 450 million cubic meters of
water are annually supplied to Israel. Though Israel has created other water
resource developments such as water recycling and collection systems, water
overuse forces it to rely heavily on the rain-fed West Bank aquifers. Where the
problem truly lies, however, is that these aquifers exist under Palestinian land
seized by the Israeli government. Israel does not allow the Palestinian Authority
any access to the resources and controls the use of water by limiting
Palestinian usage. To maintain their higher living standards and consumption,
Israel uses around 93 percent of the West Bank aquifers’ annual rainwater
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recharge.38 The World Health Organization and the United States Agency for
International Development recommend 100 liters of water per capita per day as
the minimum quantity for basic consumption. But daily per capita water
consumption for the West Bank amounts to some 73 liters per day for
Palestinians, while Israelis enjoy three times that amount with daily usage rate
around 242 liters per day.39 Essentially, 20 percent of Israeli settlers are
allocated more water than the remaining 80 percent of Palestinians in the West
Bank. A report by Amnesty International states, “Israel allows the Palestinians
access to only a fraction of the shared water resources, which lie mostly in the
occupied West Bank, while the unlawful Israeli settlements there receive
virtually unlimited supplies.”40 Under an interim agreement with the
Palestinian Authority in 1995, certain quantities are allocated for Palestinian
usage, but Palestinians are denied the right to drill new wells in any of the
aquifers. In addition, the surface water of the Jordan River remains disputed
between Israel, Syria, and Lebanon and prevents Israelis from exploiting the
river as a major additional source of freshwater. The importance of the West
Bank aquifers to Israel grows exponentially and adds one more reason for the
continued Israeli dominance over the West Bank. Granting Palestinians
sovereignty would mean relinquishing control of the aquifers; a situation highly
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implausible considering the scarcity of water in the region and the threat it
would constitute to Israel’s economic and national security. No peace process
has made any progress on the issue, no amount of fences and security barriers
can ensure Israel’s water security, and certainly no partition of land between
the two sides is likely to initiate a practical solution. If Israel refuses to share or
render control over the aquifers under any agreement, then it only makes a
two-state even more difficult and seemingly impossible.
A final reason Israeli settlements will not be removed is the fervor with
which religious, nationalist Jews and Zionists view the West Bank as an
integral part of Greater Israel. While statesmen like Sharon, Rabin, Olmert, and
Barak attach political and national security objectives to the retention and
occupation of the West Bank, many Israeli settlers believe creating a
Palestinian state in the West Bank would be tantamount to national and
religious treason. For many of these religious settlers, the land of the West
Bank, which they refer to by their biblical names of Judea and Samaria, is
considered a divine right and carries an almost mythical significance. As
mentioned before, many settlers are drawn to the West Bank for pragmatic
incentives such as affordable housing, generous tax breaks, and subsidized
schools, but there also exists a section of settlers who view living in these
settlements and outposts as a religious duty. Extreme nationalist, religious
movements like Gush Emunim, which sprung up during the early 1970s,
actively pursued an agenda of Jewish settlement in the West Bank. After the
right wing Likud Party was elected in 1977, the members of Gush Emunim
29

openly celebrated believing Prime Minister Menachem Begin would be a willing
ally in their drive to colonize Palestinian land. But the Gush Emunim was
severely disappointed by Begin and the Likud when Israel signed a peace treaty
with Egypt in 1977. The peace treaty was considered a treasonous act by the
settlers and going against the very tenets of religious Zionist ideology. But if
movements like Gush Emunim believed in apocalyptic fantasies based on
religious doctrine, the governing parties of the Israeli state, regardless of which
side they fell on the political spectrum, had a much more rational and realistic
approach. As Shimon Peres, a supporter of these settler movements at the time
of their inception, remarked, “To the credit of the Gush Emunim people, it
should be said that they do not base themselves on the security argument, but
rather on the historical argument…But in addition to our historical right there
is also a historical obligation: to preserve the Jewish character of the state, and
not just a formal deed of ownership.”41 Though Peres’ admission was certainly
a disingenuous attempt to placate the movement, it clearly highlighted his
unwillingness to place matters of historical or religious precedence above
matters of security and state. Every prime minister of Israel, whether Labor or
Likud, has openly supported the Israeli settler movement in the occupied
Palestinian territories, but their support only extends to a certain point. With
regards to the state, the settlements were meant simply as a means to exert
territorial control over Palestinian land and base the government’s defense
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strategy on the map of settlement construction and policy. Herein lays the
dichotomy of the Israeli settler movement in a nutshell. Though supportive of
settlements in as much as they fulfilled certain objectives pertaining to national
interest, the government was neither willing nor interested in turning matters
of state into a religious battlefield. However, it must be made clear, differences
among Israeli leaders and the Israeli public does not mean settlement policy
will be altered anytime in the near future.
Construction of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem
presently continues unabated to the chagrin of Palestinian leaders and citizens.
The battle over settlement policy neither includes nor takes into account the
aspirations or rights of the Palestinian people for independent statehood. In
reality, settlement policy is an internal Israeli issue in which Palestinians have
absolutely no power whatsoever in the matter. When Israel decides it wants to
build new settlements, which it so often does, it does not consult Palestinian
leaders or the international community on the wisdom or legality of the issue; it
simply takes a unilateral decision and begins construction. Whether Israelis
wish to acknowledge the fact in the present or the future, these unilateral
decisions have completely and irreversibly altered the nature of the conflict. For
all intents and purposes, the two-state solution might not be completely dead
but it certainly has been comatose for some time. Partitioning the land under
normal circumstances would be a difficult task on its own; partitioning land
under these circumstances is virtually next to impossible.
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The Role of Demographics
In August 2005, for the first time in their history Israeli Jews were no
longer the absolute majority in territories they controlled (In Israel proper Jews
still constitute an overwhelming majority.) According to Israel’s Central Bureau
of Statistics there were approximately 5.26 million Jews living in Israel and the
Palestinian Territories, while the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics showed
around 5.62 non-Jews.42 Professor Arnon Soffer, chair of geostrategic studies
at Haifa University, predicts that by the year 2020 there will be 6.3 million
Jews and 8.8 million Palestinians due to higher birth rates among the
Palestinian population.43 The debate among Israelis about the so called
“demographic threat” is certainly not a new phenomenon. Since the founding of
the state of Israel in 1948, the earliest Zionist leaders have maintained an
ongoing obsession with maintaining the Jewish character of the state; an
obsession that manifests itself mostly when the subject of demographics arises.
Israeli policy concerning the growing population of Palestinian is very similar to
its policy concerning settlements; Israel wants to unilaterally create and
implement policies which would see it physically keep hold of the territories in
the West Bank, but it neither wants to grant Palestinians any political rights,
nor does it wish to assume the responsibilities of governing the population. In
other words, Israel wants Palestinian land without Palestinian people.
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Even if there is debate concerning population projections, there is no
debate Israel will have to contend with the fact that there will be a considerably
larger Palestinian population in the near future. Judging by the current
circumstances, Israel only has a few distinct alternatives to maintaining its
demographic majority. First, Israel can vacate all settlements built behind the
Green Line and allow for a creation of an independent Palestinian state in the
West Bank and Gaza. Doing so would not only assure Israel preserves its
Jewish character, it also would bring about a workable solution to the conflict.
However, Israel has no intention of either withdrawing to the 1967 borders, nor
does it have any intention of removing 500,000 Israeli settlers from the West
Bank (an issue discussed more in detail in the previous chapter).
A second option would be the forcible transfer or expulsion of
Palestinians. Though committing ethnic cleansing or genocide on a large scale
would be highly improbable in the present day, this option certainly does carry
some credence among some Israeli politicians and political parties. Leaders of
some Israeli Knesset parties such as Moledet and the National Union Bloc have
openly called for the forcible removal and transfer of Palestinians. As National
Union Bloc politician and Knesset member Effie Eitam argued, “It’s impossible
with all of these Arabs, and it is impossible to give up the territory. We will
have to expel the great majority of the Arabs from Judea and Samaria.”44
Though Eitam’s racist views were condemned by Israel’s more liberal
44

Makdisi. Saree. (2008). Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation. W. W. Norton &Company. New York. Pg.
11.

33

politicans, his positions were not as extreme as they had made it seem. For
decades, Israel has adopted an implicit policy of “voluntary transfer” of the
Palestinian population. During the War of 1948, over 800,000 Palestinians
either fled or were forced from their homes by the advancing Israeli army; a
scenario highly unlikely to happen because of the vast degree and speed
information and news travels in the present day. Therefore, Israel adopted a
deliberate campaign of making life so unbearable and miserable for the
Palestinian population it would force Palestinians to begin leaving their homes
under the increasing pressure. An excellent example of the “voluntary transfer”
policy is the construction of the separation barrier in the West Bank and East
Jerusalem. Begun in 2000, the barrier encompasses some 760 kilometers and
includes over 12 percent of territory which belongs to the Palestinians; territory
which would ultimately be included in a future Palestinian state.45 Israel has
always argued that the purpose of the barrier was to deter and prevent any
Palestinians from entering Israeli territory and committing terrorist acts. But
the Israeli claims of security issues have no basis, since Israel decided to build
a large part of the barrier on large swaths of Palestinian land. The 2004 ruling
of the International Court of Justice made it clear Israel has every right to build
a barrier, but that barrier must be contained within its internationally
recognized territory.46 Therefore, the ruling by the ICJ deemed the barrier
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illegal under international law. Israel, however, was under no illusions about
the legality of the barrier or its intended consequences on the Palestinian
population. Israeli colonel Shaul Arieli clearly defines the objective when he
says:
The enclave in this area captured no less than nine Palestinian villages
in the area between the deep-territory barrier and the separation fence that
runs along the Green Line. The objective is for them to not have access to the
State of Israel, for demographic reasons. Conversely, the Palestinian authorities
will have a hard time supplying the residents of this area with health,
education and legal services, not to mention jobs. The village residents will not
be able to continue living under these sorts of conditions. They will abandon
their homes and go to the big cities, at which point it will be possible to expand
the borders of the State of Israel without paying the demographic price. It
would be voluntary transfer.47
The true problem for Zionists is –and always has been- the land they
desire comes with Palestinians already existing on it. As the late Israeli
sociologist Baruch Kimmerling observed, “One Zionist imperative –to possess
the largest possible amount of sacred land-contradicting the other Zionist
imperative-to ensure a massive Jewish majority inhabiting a land that was
preferably free of all Arabs.”48 But if Israel is unwilling to remove the
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settlements and cannot openly ethnically cleanse the Palestinian population;
then simply one final alternative remains. The abandonment of the impractical
two-state solution for the adoption of a single state where both Israelis and
Palestinians enjoy full and equal political and human rights. This scenario is
not as far-fetched or impossible as it would seem. Both Israelis and
Palestinians understand and acknowledge certain compromises have to be
made to reach a peaceful resolution. Though the one-state solution is still
confined to a minority in Israeli and Palestinian societies, the impending
realities of the “facts on the ground” created by Israel will force both parties to
reassess their positions and abandon certain tenets of their respective agendas.
The Palestinians are cognizant of the fact in the very near future they will
have a larger population than the Israelis. However, being a majority does not
automatically lead to a shift in the balance of power within a society. Even if
Palestinians will outnumber Israelis, like the black community in South Africa
outnumbered the Afrikaners, the Israelis will still control all the infrastructures
of state power, which they will certainly not hesitate to use once that position
of privilege is under threat. Like the Israelis, Palestinians would admittedly
prefer their own independent state. But as Israeli intransigence on issues like
the settlements continues to advance then more and more Palestinians will
begin to accept the fact that an independent state is no longer a geographic
possibility. Birzeit Univerity Professor Ali Jarbawi states that, “Most
Palestinians prefer the idea of separation, because they want their own state.
But Sharon’s idea of a two-state solution is to squeeze us into cantons…Given
36

a choice between cantonization and one state, Palestinians will go for the
latter.”49 With over half a million Israeli settlers in the Palestinian territories
and around 20 percent of Israel’s population being Palestinian, the reality is
the two peoples have already been demographically integrated and inseparable.
There is not and has never been a time since 1948 where the two peoples have
been completely separated. Palestinians have always existed within the Israeli
state since its founding, and since 1967 Israelis have been living in the
occupied territories. As early as 1999, the late Palestinian professor Edward
Said noted that an independent Palestinian state was, “just as unworkable as
the principle of separation between a demographically mixed, irreversibly
connected Arab and Jewish population in Israel and the occupied territories…I
therefore see no other way than to begin now to speak about sharing the land
that has thrust us together, sharing it in a truly democratic way, with equal
rights for all citizens.”50
Electronic Intifada cofounder and author of One Country Ali Abunimah
believes the shift in the Palestinian position towards a single state can be
drawn from specific three factors. First, is the acceptance by the vast majority
of both Israelis and Palestinians of the reality that neither one nor the other is
going to disappear. Secondly, Abunimah believes Palestinians have grown
disenchanted with and have abandoned the old and outdated ideas of
decolonization and indigenous nationalism. Finally, he argues that decades of
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the diaspora life in multiethnic democracies across North America, Europe, and
the Middle East have shown Palestinians a better way of achieving freedom
than forming a state on nationalist, religious, or ethnic terms.51
But if the Palestinians, being the far weaker side in the balance of power,
are willing to accept de facto the idea of a one state solution, then what about
the Israelis? In the simplest of terms, Israel has no choice but to accept that its
policies over the course of the preceding decades has destroyed any hope or
prospect for a practical two-state solution. The Israelis being the more
dominant side in the conflict would no doubt believe they are the party making
the more painful and costly concessions. Israel would not only be relinquishing
its prime position politically and militarily, it would also be asked to abandon
its Zionist dream of a Greater Israel from the Jordan River to the
Mediterranean Sea. To the Israelis, maintaining their Jewishness as a state is
just as important as maintaining their regional military superiority. Israel is a
state that is heavily driven by national as well as ideological interests. However,
politics and ideology do not always go hand in hand. Israeli leaders understand
the very survival of the state is in jeopardy if it does not curtail its ideological
pursuits.
Jewish history, especially in the mid-20th century, has been an often sad
and tragic story of severe persecution, oppression, and genocide. There is
absolutely no reason why Jews around the world should not be afforded the
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same human and political rights as any other peoples or nations. However,
Jewish victimhood does not justify Israel’s continued oppression and
dispossession of the Palestinian people. There is an extremely crucial point that
must be addressed when discussing the topic of Jews and their relation to the
state of Israel. Not all Jews are Israeli or Zionist. In fact, of the worldwide
population of approximately 14 million Jews only some 42 percent reside in
Israel and the remaining 58 percent reside in states around the world.52
Though Israel often portrays itself as a defender and authority of and for Jews
around the world, the reality is quite different. True, there are many Diaspora
Jews who do feel a spiritual or cultural affinity with the state of Israel, but
some of Israel’s harshest critics have been individuals of Jewish descent, both
Israeli and non-Israeli. Like every other nation across the globe, Jews are
neither a politically homogenous group, nor are they all supporters of the
Zionist movement and the state of Israel. Where there is a consensus,
however, among both Israeli and non-Israeli Jews (and among Palestinians as
well) is the need for a permanent resolution to the conflict. Because of the
Jewish experience, many Israelis believe a state without a Jewish majority
based on Jewish principles is equivalent to no state at all. But many Israelis
and Jews have now realized their ideological goals are no longer applicable in
the present day, and have come to the often painful conclusion the status quo
is no longer sustainable. There are two specific factors which merit this claim.
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Both factors not only address Israel’s character as a Jewish state, they also
address the future of Israel’s very existence.
First, Israel cannot preserve its stated goal of being a Jewish, democratic
state. Since its founding in 1948, Israel has attempted to portray itself as a
state which respects the rights of all its citizens, but is distinguished by its
uniqueness as being the only Jewish state in the world. However, Israel has
continuously failed to reconcile its desire of being a democratic state with its
continued maltreatment of the Palestinian population both within Israel and in
the occupied territories. Despite a pledge in its Declaration of Independence to
produce a constitution within six months, Israel still has no such document,
instead relying on its 11 Basic Laws to deal with state institutions and
authorities.53 These 11 Basic Laws do not include guarantees on freedom of
speech, religion, or equality, but simply address matters of constitutional law
based on cases and precedents. The closest Israel has come to issuing a Bill of
Rights is its Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty, which also fails to
mention any sort of stipulation on equality, but instead emphasizes Israel’s
values as Jewish and democratic. As a result of these omissions on the issue of
equality, state-organized discrimination cannot be easily challenged or proven
within the Israeli court system. Palestinians wishing to bring claims of
discrimination to the courts are left to the mercy of Israeli judges who possess
no concrete legal framework to address their issues and grievances.
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In the battle over demographics it is easy to lose sight of the fact that
approximately 20 percent of Israel’s population consists of citizens of
Palestinian descent. Oftentimes, the focus of the conflict centers mainly on
Israel’s policies in the occupied territories forgetting the fact Palestinians living
within Israel face severe institutional discrimination as well. Though Israel
claims to uphold democratic values for all its citizens, it is clear Jews and
Judaism occupy a privileged position as the religion of the majority. Jewish
religious holidays, Jewish holy sites, and Jewish schools are the only ones
recognized, protected, and funded by the state.54 Because of the fear of being
over populated by Palestinians, Israel has passed legislation such as the 1950
Law of Return which gives every Jew in the world the right to migrate to Israel
and receive automatic citizenship regardless of birthplace or existing
nationality.55 Palestinians, however, are not afforded the same rights under any
circumstances. A 1970’s ruling by Israel’s High Court of Justice states, “there
is no Israeli nation separate from the Jewish people. The Jewish people is
composed not only of those residing in Israel but also of Diaspora Jewry.”56
Since Palestinians are not members of the Jewish nation, even if some do
possess Israeli citizenship, they are not afforded the same benefits as members
of that nation. For example, in the legal administrative process Israelis are tried
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by civil law while Palestinians in the occupied territories fall under the
jurisdiction of military law. Palestinian citizens of Israel not only face
systematic discrimination; they are openly referred to as a “fifth column” - an
insidious and dangerous minority which seeks to undermine and poses a
threat to Israel’s national security. In a highly contentious move, Israel even
amended its citizenship laws calling on all non-Jews to pledge loyalty to Israel
as a Jewish and democratic state. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
defended the amendment stating, “There is broad agreement in Israel on the
Jewish identity and the democracy of the state of Israel; this is the foundation
of our existence here.”
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Even Arab Knesset (Israel’s Parliament) members are not immune to
such overtly racist accusations. Members of the Arab Balad Party Amzi Bishara
and Ahmed Tibi were barred by Israel’s Central Election Committee because
they were accused of rejecting “the Jewish and democratic nature of the state,
incited to racism, or supported armed struggle against Israel.”58 Though the
decision was later overturned by the High Court of Justice, it clearly highlights
the difficulties and dangers faced by Palestinians existing within Israeli society,
including members of Israel’s own parliament. Judging Israel by its treatment
and policies regarding the Palestinians, both in the occupied territories and in
Israel proper, the argument or claim of being “the only democracy in the Middle
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East” holds no value when placed under closer scrutiny. Essentially, Israelis
have two choices in the direction they wish to lead their state. Either Israel
remains a Jewish state which cannot be democratic, or it becomes a
democratic state which cannot be Jewish.
The second reason a one-state solution would be the more practical
approach is the recognition that in the modern era of multi-ethnic nation states
the idea of a state based on ethno-religious exclusivity is an archaic notion of
the past. Many states around the world have their official religion as
Christianity or Islam, and there is no reason why Israelis should not want
Judaism as an official state religion. However, having Judaism recognized as
an official state religion is very different than demanding recognition of Israel
as a Jewish state. The former recognizes the will of a majority of the
population, while the latter denies the minority equal status under the law,
basically relegating them to second class citizenship. Israel’s insistence on
recognition as a Jewish state stems not only from the desire to be a homeland
for the Jewish nation; it also gives credence to the religious claim that the land
was the spiritual and ancestral home of the Jewish nation stretching back
thousands of years. Understandably, Palestinians take issue with this claim
because it rejects their rights as documented residents also stretching back
centuries, and acceptance of the Israeli-Jewish narrative would justify the
historical injustice committed against the Palestinians when the state of Israel
was created and would essentially mean the forfeiture of their rights and
claims.
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Critics of the one-state solution have launched scathing attacks arguing
the proposal would mean the end of Israel as a Jewish state. Some critics have
even gone as far as justifying and calling for ethnic cleansing to preserve a
Jewish majority. In a 2004 interview, Israeli historian Benny Morris claims,
“there are circumstances in history that justify ethnic cleansing.” A Jewish
state “would not have come into being without the uprooting of 700,000
Palestinians. There was no choice but to expel the population. It was necessary
to cleanse the hinterland and cleanse the border areas and cleanse the main
roads.”59 And Israeli demographic expert Professor Arnon Soffer, a major
proponent of separation from the Palestinians, bluntly states that, “Unilateral
separation does not guarantee ‘peace’ it guarantees a Zionist-Jewish state with
an overwhelming majority of Jews… So, if we want to remain alive, we will have
to kill and kill and kill. All day, every day.”60 Though these are extreme
examples of the sort of policies officially advocated, it highlights the
desperation and the length some are willing to go to preserve a Jewish majority
in Israel.
While some Israelis lament the demise of Israel’s Jewish majority and
would resort to extremes to preserve it, there are others who have accepted,
whether on the basis of fact or principle, that one-state is the only remaining
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and reasonable solution. University of East London professor Haim Bresheeth
sensed the lack of realistic alternatives when he said:
This is not something I find easy to say, as an Israeli and son of
Holocaust survivors. I would like to be able to argue for an Israeli-Hebrew
entity -- not a Zionist militarist enterprise, of course, but a democratic,
autonomous political and cultural entity twinned with a similar Palestinian
entity. But after four decades of military rule and all the desecration of
political, human, civil, property and other forms of rights by the occupation
regime, most reasonable people will agree that no support can be given to this
outdated, violent, immoral and inefficient mode of domination of one people
over another… Many Palestinians are now returning to an earlier, more
principled stage of their political development and argument -- the PLO
solution of a secular, democratic single state in the whole of Palestine; one
state that allows equal rights to Jews and Arabs alike. It is ironic that through
failing to grasp the nettle which would have enabled them to keep a separate
Israeli state in the pre- 1967 borders, Israeli leaders have forced a change in
Palestinian thinking: "if we are not allowed to live as a free people in 22 percent
of our country, or come to that, even 10 per cent of it, maybe we should go
back to fighting to liberate the whole country, for both people to live in peace,
as equals.61
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Others supporters have taken an approach based on principle, believing
militarism and separation will neither ensure Israel’s long-term security, nor
will it bring any justice to Israelis and Palestinians. Long time Israeli peace
activist Haim Hanegbi addresses the moral conundrum Israel faces because of
its treatment of Palestinians and the harm it has done to Israel’s character and
standing:
There is something genetic here that doesn't allow us truly to recognize
the Palestinians, that doesn't allow us to make peace with them. And that
something has to do with the fact that even before the return of the land and
the houses and the money, the settlers' first act of expiation toward the natives
of this land must be to restore to them their dignity, their memory, their
justness. But that is just what we are incapable of doing. Our past won't allow
us to do it. Our past forces us to believe in the project of a Jewish nation-state
that is a hopeless cause. Our past prevents us from seeing that the whole story
of Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel is over. Israel as a Jewish state can
no longer exist here. In the long term, Israel as a Jewish state will not be able
to exist.62
And Meron Benvenisti, former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, is
unequivocal when he states, “today we are living in a bi-national reality, and it
is a permanent given. It cannot be ignored and it cannot be denied. What we
have to do is adapt our thinking and our concepts to this reality. We have to
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look for a new model that will fit this reality. And the right questions have to be
asked, even if they give the impression of a betrayal of Zionism; even if they
give the feeling that one is abandoning the dream of establishing a Jewish
nation-state in the Land of Israel.”63
Israel, which has sought to maintain a Jewish majority and possession of
as much land as possible, now has to come to grips with the reality its dream
of a Jewish, democratic state is no longer achievable. Ironically, it is not the
Palestinians who are responsible for the quandary Israel now faces, but
erroneous and short-sighted decisions and policies undertaken by Israel have
left it potentially guilty of its own demise. But all hope is not lost for the future.
Israel can still guarantee its survival if it accepts an exclusive ethno-religious
state has no place in the modern world. Just as the Israelis are not going to
disappear or abandon the land, they must understand and accept neither will
the Palestinians.
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The Model of One-State
The great advantage of the one state solution is that it allows all peoples
to live freely within the entire state enjoying equal individual and collective
political rights, while preserving their own ethnic and cultural identities and
communities. Furthermore, a single state can potentially put an end to years of
acrimonious disputes about territory, population, and historical injustices
bringing about a real opportunity for stability in an often violent and chaotic
region. The physical impossibility of two states means the single state
alternative is the only practical alternative remaining. But a single state option
does not necessarily mean a single option for statehood. In other words, there
are many examples of what constitutes a single state. It could be a federation
or unitary state with either a presidential or parliamentary system.64 A binational state where the two peoples share the country but remain ethnically
separated, or an integrated, secular, democratic state based on individual
citizenship and equal rights like those found in most Western liberal
democracies.65 It has been a common refrain among detractors of the one-state
solution that previous models or precedents are not applicable to
Israel/Palestine because of the seemingly intractable nature of the conflict. But
this argument negates the fact other violent and apparently insoluble conflicts
have been ended through a variety of peacemaking and state-building
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strategies. When one looks at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict there are a few
recent examples in modern history which can be used as blueprints for
achieving a peaceful solution.
Though each conflict is unique in its own right, there still remains
striking similarities between experiences in such cases as South Africa,
Northern Ireland, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition, the cases of
Belgium and Switzerland will be discussed since they demonstrate how some
democratic countries have successfully managed conflicts between ethnic,
religious, and linguistic communities. In South Africa during the apartheid era
there existed a systemic and structural discrimination, while in Northern
Ireland the conflict was steeped in major historical and ethnic tensions.
Though both these conflicts went on for decades, eventually a peaceful solution
was attained. Analyzing the differences and similarities between all these cases
will lead to a better understanding for the chances of success in a single state
for Israelis and Palestinians.

The South Africa and Northern Ireland Option
Inevitable comparisons have been made between the old apartheid
regime that existed in South Africa and the current situation of the
Palestinians living under Israeli occupation. Though there are certain
differences in their stated policies, the comparisons between the two states
reveal a strikingly similar history. Coincidentally, both South Africa and Israel
trace their beginnings to the year 1948. The Afrikaner Nationalist Party gained
49

control in South Africa, and Palestine was partitioned by the United Nations.
South Africa was one of the first countries in the world to recognize Israel, and
its Prime Minister D.F. Malan was the first foreign chief of government to visit
it. The connection between the newly founded governments was evident from
the start, as both felt that their victories were achieved by some divine right
they were destined to achieve. They believed their successes were based on the
fact a much more superior people and society had overtaken backward, inferior
territories and transformed them into legitimate, civilized states. The white,
South African Nationalists believed that they were “par excellence the nation of
the Book; Zionist Jews were returning to the promised land of their ancestors
that had been given to them by God.66
Since both states drew inspiration from the colonial model of conquest,
land was extremely important to both Israel and South Africa. The success of
these states depended on the deliberate dispossession of the indigenous
populations. As discussed previously, the settlers in both states relied and
unabashedly promoted the myth of “empty lands”. Contrary to these myths,
however, both South Africa and Palestine were inhabited by other peoples,
South Africa by black Africans and Palestine by Palestinian Arabs. When the
Dutch settlers arrived in the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, the land was already
inhabited by native Africans. By the time of the creation of the Union in 1910,
the settler society had consolidated its land base in South Africa, and the

66

Davis, Uri. (2003). Aparthied Israel: Possibilities for the Struggle Within. London. Zed Books.

50

Africans were confined by law to certain areas referred to as “reserves”.
Eventually these “reserves” where converted into ten “homelands”, which
constituted less than 8 percent, later expanded to the 13 percent, of the total
land area of the Republic. The white, ruling government then drafted what was
commonly known as the Land Act, which confined African purchases and
agriculture to these generally unproductive areas.
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As George Fredrickson

describes, “The architects of the Land Act of 1913 had certainly not envisioned
a total and permanent partition of population; in fact their main concern was
to increase the supply of labor available to white farmers and industrialists by
stifling the incipient growth of an African peasant class outside the reserved
areas.”68
Zionist propaganda also relied on the “land without a people for a people
without a land” myth. Unfortunately for these settlers, however, this assertion
was totally untrue. In his classical work on early Zionism The Crisis, Hillel
Zeitlen charged that what the Zionists bent on settlement “forgot, mistakenly or
maliciously, is that Palestine belongs to others, and is totally inhabited.”69 In
any case, Zionist settlers did enter Palestine and eventually forcibly removed
the native Arabs from the land. Only a small percentage of the population
remained in Israel, while the rest were either forced out and became refugees in
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camps in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Israeli
government officials recognizing the problem they had, devised a set of laws to
ensure Palestinians, both inside of Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza,
would never have the opportunity to reclaim their lost lands or purchase new
property. These laws were created not only to expropriate land belonging to
Palestinian refugees, but also to some of those belonging to the minority
Palestinian population who were able to remain inside Israel proper.
The Law of Acquisition of Absentees’ Property gave settlers the right to
lease or even dispose of property belonging not only to refugees forcibly
removed, but also because of the irregular wording of the law, Palestinians who
had not even left their homes.70 Fundamentally, what this law meant was that
Palestinian refugees, referred to by Israeli law as “absentees”, could never claim
land they were displaced from, which under the Geneva Conventions had every
right to return to, and even more amazingly the government could marshal the
homes while Palestinians still lived in them. As Sir John Hope Simpson, who
studied the situation in British Mandate Palestine for the British government
commented, “It ceases to be land from which the Arab can gain any advantage
now or in the future. Not only can he never hope to lease or cultivate it, but by
the stringent provisions of the lease of the Jewish National Fund, he is deprived
forever from employment on the land.”71 The Jewish National Fund was an
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organization created by the first Zionists back in 1901 to secure landownership
for Jews in Palestine. In the present time, The Jewish National Fund is a quasigovernmental organization owning approximately 13 percent of state land in
Israel; land which it has consistently refused to sell or lease to the non-Jewish
population.72
Other laws enacted include the Defense Laws of 1945 which gave a
military governor the power to declare an area “closed”, thus denying villagers
who fled or were expelled from their homes the right to return. And the
Emergency Laws of 1949 gave the Minister of Defense of the Israel government
the power to declare an area a “Security Area” and expel the inhabitants from
it.73 Through these laws the lands of refugees were taken, as well as most of
the lands belonging to Palestinians who remained in the state of Israel. Over 90
percent of the land within the borders of the state is presently held either by
the state itself or by the Jewish National Fund, meaning Palestinians cannot
return to homes they were forced out of, cannot purchase any land even if they
had the money to pay for it, and cannot try to lease or work on land officially
reserved for Israeli Jews. It must be noted that these laws not only apply to
Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza who do not possess Israeli
citizenship, but also to those Israeli Arabs who under the laws of the state are
given “full political rights” like Jewish Israelis.
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In addition to the many similarities the two states shared, there are some
differences between the two states which merit discussion. Unlike South Africa
which served a geo-strategic, economic purpose for the great colonial powers,
Israel was created to solve a political problem. The Afrikaner project was also
different in that it wanted to subjugate and rule over the black population,
while the Zionist project wanted to negate the idea of a non-Jewish population.
In the case of South Africa, the state developed a policy of “separate
development” and “independent homelands”. These designated areas gave
control of only 13 percent of the total land of South Africa, and was deliberately
meant to deny any citizenship rights to black Africans, knowing that giving
them citizenship would have to include them into the democratic process. By
keeping the black Africans entrenched in this 13 percent and effectively
excluded from holding any meaningful government positions, the white
minority government could keep total state and governmental control.74
The case of Israel, however, was more complicated based on various
reasons. First, Israel is much smaller geographically than South Africa;
therefore, there was not enough land to separate the indigenous populations
into small cantons away from the settler population. Second, unlike the whites
of South Africa who wanted to rule over the population, the Zionist settlers goal
from the beginning was to cleanse the land of the native inhabitants. The
ultimate objective of these Zionist settlers was to establish an exclusively
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Jewish state, which entailed forcibly removing Palestinian Arabs. Finally, if
Israel chose to abide by the democratic process, it would mean rights would
have to be given not just to Palestinians who remained in Israel after 1948, but
also all the refugees evicted from their lands and homes by the creation of the
state of Israel.
History has shown time and time again that trying to achieve security
through violence and the subjugation of another is futile- unless complete
genocide is committed. Privileged groups have always felt insecure about
relinquishing their privileges, both for the obvious reason of power, and from
fear of being consumed by the majority. As the last apartheid-era South
African president F.W. de Klerk speaking about Afrikaner nationalism states
that it “was our conviction that without apartheid, our people would be
swamped by the vast black majority- and this would inevitably lead to the
extinction of our own hard-won right to national self-determination.”75 It is a
similar feared voiced by many Israelis that a one-state solution would not only
mean the end of a Jewish state, but would also threaten the very existence of
the Jewish people under fear of reprisals and revenge at the hands of
Palestinians- based on the racist assumption Palestinians are inherently
violent and unable to engage and adapt to the tenets of the democratic ideal.
Another example would be the case of Northern Ireland, where Protestant
Unionists and Catholic Republicans fought for decades before a peace deal was
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reached with the 1998 Good Friday Agreements. The Unionists, backed by the
British government, dominated the government in Northern Ireland and clearly
enjoyed an economic advantage compared with Catholics who suffered years of
disenfranchisement and exclusion. Both sides had to abandon their claims to
exclusive ethnic possession of the land and begin a reconciliation process
based on the democratic process. Through a varying set of agreements, both
agreed to respect the political and human rights of the other, and recognize the
traditions of each of Northern Ireland’s communities. Like the case of South
Africa, the agreement in Northern Ireland was based on the fundamental
recognition by the privileged party (the Protestants) that maintenance of the
status quo was untenable, and the only way towards a peaceful resolution was
the acceptance of a negotiated power sharing agreement between the two sides.
The Northern Ireland conflict can also serve as a valuable lesson on the need to
include all parties in the negotiated process. The Protestant Unionists
designated the Irish Republican Army as “terrorists”, but when the time came
for a peacemaking settlement the IRA was included in the process. The same
would have to been done with parties like Hamas which Israel designates a
“terrorist organization”. Peace is not made between friends, it is made between
enemies. Therefore, a solution can only be successful if all parties are included
in the process; no matter how despicably one side is viewed by the other.
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The Belgium and Switzerland Option
In addition to the examples of South Africa and Northern Ireland, there
are also two more options to consider when debating the nature of the onestate solution -those of Belgium and Switzerland. Both states are based on a
federalist system which incorporates and addresses the needs of the various
communities in existence. Belgium has a parliamentary system with universal
suffrage, and the country is split between the two main groups, the Flemish
and the Walloons. About 60 percent of the population lives in the Flemish
region, while the Walloons comprise some 30 percent of the remaining
population. Belgian political parties only run candidates in their own region
and language and the Flemish region elects about 60 percent of the seats in
parliament-proportional to the total population.76 Canada has a similar system
split between the French and English speaking parts of the country. Because of
the similarities in geography, demographics, and two distinct communities,
Belgium can be used to determine the success of such a system in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Though plagued by violence and bitterness in the past, in
the present day Belgians rely heavily on negotiations to find a middle ground.
Although neither side is completely satisfied with certain political outcomes,
they are not discontented enough to take up arms and start a bloody conflict. It
must be noted, however, that in the last few years Belgium has undergone a
political crisis with the country having no elected government in the last fifteen
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months.77 Though presently Belgium is not a model of political stability,
Israelis and Palestinians can only hope for an instability similar to that which
exists in Belgium today.
If there is a model of political stability that can also serve as a framework
for a single state, then Switzerland is certainly an excellent example. Like
Belgium, Switzerland’s political system relies on a federalist form of
government which decentralizes authority to each of its 26 self-governing
cantons.78 But whereas Belgium has been plagued in the past by violent
conflict between its two groups, the Swiss have largely avoided any ethnic
tensions, and unlike Belgium Switzerland does not suffer from the alienation of
one ethnic group from another. Germans, French, and Italians all live and
move freely about the country and each group is allowed to administer and
govern its own respective populations with the federal government handling
such tasks as foreign affairs and the management of currency.79 The Swiss
model is not unlike the United States where individual states are left alone to
manage and govern their own affairs answering to the federal government only
in national matters.
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Potential Framework for a Single State
Based on the previous examples, Israelis and Palestinians do have a
number of options to consider when the time arrives to determine how their
new state would look like. However, debating the state’s precise design at this
point would be premature. Like the case of South Africa, the transition to
statehood must first be preceded by intense discussions on such issues as
security, economics, political and individual freedoms. Changing attitudes,
preparing and informing citizens of both sides on the need and necessity for
patience, compromise, and negotiations will arguably prove more difficult than
the state building process itself. Expecting either side to simply forget or set
aside decades of acrimony, bloodshed, and violent history in a short time would
be naïve and unrealistic. The entire process will take time and enormous
amounts of effort, but it is not impossible. Before a specific model of
government is chosen, it would be important to discuss a set of principles
which could serve as a preliminary framework. Drawing inspiration from past
peace agreements in South Africa and North Ireland and from circumstances
unique to this particular conflict, the following principles can serve as a
possible blueprint for a future one state solution:

1.

Recognize the rights of all citizens regardless of race, ethnicity, and
religious background. All shall be equal under the laws of the state.
The law shall enshrine the separation of church and state. Religious
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traditions can be recognized and respected but the state will remain
the ultimate authority on legal matters and maintain strict neutrality
in religious affairs.
2. Acknowledge the unique culture and histories of Jews and
Palestinians within the land while respecting the right of any citizen
who does not wish to be identified or belong to either community.
Granting a degree of autonomy to each community to pursue and
preserve its own linguistic and cultural traditions is also possible.
3. All citizens will be allowed the right to freedom of movement and be
permitted to seek residence of their choosing eliminating any form of
land tenure and ownership based on ethnic or religious background.
4. Shared responsibility for the city of Jerusalem and its holy sites while
recognizing the unique history and importance to all Christians,
Muslims, and Jews throughout the world. Each quarter can be
administered by its respective religious denomination. If the parties
cannot reach any workable agreement, then there is also the option of
internationalizing the city and placing its jurisdiction under a panel of
various religious and international administrators.
5. Negotiate a just and practical resolution to the Palestinian refugee
issue. While acknowledging that the Palestinian right of return is a
principle protected under international law, allowing the return of a
vast number of refugees would upset the population balance in the
country. Those Palestinians not wishing to return or choose to settle
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elsewhere shall be granted just compensation. Jewish immigration
must also be monitored and negotiated for the same reasons.
6. Create a centralized education system which offers equal
opportunities for both communities and oversees education for the
entire country. Taking into account cultural and linguistic differences,
the state can create mechanisms allowing a degree of autonomy for
each community to decide on educational matters pertaining to their
respective communities. However, the state is the ultimate arbiter in
ensuring against any form of discrimination, racism, or segregation.
7. The state must actively pursue and promote equal economic
opportunities for all citizens. Any sort of special financial privileges
based on race, ethnicity, or religion must be abolished. Employers
cannot allow any discriminatory hiring practices and all workers must
be paid fair and minimum wages set by the discretion of the state.

Of course, the principles set forth are general and vague in nature, but
are only meant to serve the specific purpose of a starting point and highlight
what a future agreement might entail. Judging by the current circumstances, it
would be a serious stretch of the imagination to believe all problems can and
will be solved without serious compromises from both communities. Since
every case is unique in its own right, it would be too simplistic and
unreasonable to believe that merely transporting any of the aforementioned
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scenarios would immediately result in a solution to the daunting task that lay
ahead. Success depends heavily on the distinctive factors that shape the needs
and requirements of this particular conflict. Either Israelis and Palestinians
choose to follow the South African model of a unified, democratic state with the
principles of one-person, one-vote, or they choose the Swiss model where
separate Israeli and Palestinian administrative units are linked to a centralized
federal government, it does not change the fact a two-state solution is no longer
applicable. The question is not whether Israelis and Palestinians will end up
coexisting in a single state, but when and in what capacity.
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Advantages of the One-State Solution
In the previous chapters, the success of the one-state solution has been
primarily based on the factors of practicality and inevitability driven by the
policies, decision-making, and “facts on the ground”. The one-state solution
should not be viewed by Israelis or Palestinians as a defeat or capitulation.
Despite the difficulties, a single state can be advantageous in a variety of ways
for both parties. Like the one-state solution, the choice of opting for two
independent states does not guarantee a successful conclusion to the conflict.
Creating two states could arguably prolong the conflict, because border
disputes and unresolved injustices can linger and eventually create more and
deeper problems for the future. But a one-state solution cannot only address
many deeply rooted grievances; it can also possibly serve as a starting point for
reconciliation and a truly lasting peace.
Despite the fears and misgivings of many Israelis, the one-state solution
could be a benefit which gives them the two things they most desire- peace and
security. Since its founding in 1948, Israel has been plagued by numerous
wars, occupations, and security issues. Because of its conflict with the
Palestinians, and the Arab world at large, Israel has had to rely on its military
superiority and the unconditional backing of the United States to achieve
security. But as history has shown lasting security can never be attained
simply through the use of force. A just and peaceful resolution can only come
through compromise and negotiation. The reliance on military means has failed
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to bring peace to Israelis, and one could argue it has only exacerbated the
situation, further endangered Israeli lives, and made Palestinians more
determined and steadfast in continuing an armed struggle. Only addressing the
legitimate grievances of the Palestinians will lead to the elusive peace and
security so fervently sought after by Israelis. The one-solution will not only
solve the conflict with the Palestinians, it can also bring about numerous
changes which would be in the better interest for Israel’s future.
First, having Israelis and Palestinians coexist in a single state would lead
to more integration, which could possibly lead to less acrimony and distrust.
By having the two peoples live together, it creates a degree of mutual
interdependence, invariably leading to the conclusion that sharing the land
and a future would create a variety of long-term benefits for both sides. As
international lawyer and UN Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights
Richard Falk responded when asked about the viability of a one-state solution,
“Well of course there are many variations of how a one-state solution would be
actualized in practice, and so it’s hard to anticipate exactly how it would work.
But it would overcome, if it was well implemented, this sense of hatred and
hostility between these two peoples and convey the sense that they’re sharing
land, resources, and political destiny, and that this represents the best hope of
the modern vision of a sovereign state.”80 Up until recently, the prevailing
argument has been that separation between the two peoples in two states
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bought the best chance of success for a resolution. But not only is the twostate solution simply unrealistic at this point, it is also arguably the option that
brings less, not more peace and security. An independent Palestinian state
which is neither economically viable nor in control of its own borders would
have little if any chance of success. Israel would find itself in the very same
predicament it has fought for decades to avoid- more instability in an already
unstable region. But by accepting Palestinians and affording equal status in a
single state, Israel can ensure any conflicts needing to be resolved would be
done by the ballot box rather than the barrel of a gun.
A second advantage a one-state solution would bring to Israelis is the
regional stability such a proposal would create. The conflict with Palestinians is
still Israel’s first priority, because it directly affects the day to day lives of
ordinary Israelis, and is for all intents and purposes an internal matter. But
peace with the neighboring Arab countries is also a massively important issue
for the security and future of Israel. Israel, being a nuclear power and
possessing one of the most formidable militaries in the world does not face an
imminent threat of danger from its neighbors, because most of the surrounding
Arab nations are weak militarily and economically. Israel has signed peace
treaties with both Egypt and Jordan; a peace that has lasted many years and
in both cases is in no danger of reverting to an armed conflict. Israel’s other
Arab neighbors Lebanon and Syria pose no immediate military threat to Israel.
Both states face severe economic and political problems which would prohibit
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them from attempting any military action against Israel; attempting to do so
would not only be too costly it would be foolish as well.
However, where Israel does have cause for concern is the overwhelming
anti-Israeli sentiment among the populations of the aforementioned countries.
Recent events that have caused the overthrow of the old, autocratic regimes
could pose serious problems for Israel in the near future. In the past, Israel has
relied on pro-American Arab dictators and kings to suppress popular opinion
and keep the order within their borders.81 The “Arab Spring” that has swept
across the Arab world initiating regime change in countries such as Egypt,
Tunisia, and Libya would mean the blanket of security Israel counted on in the
past can no longer be relied upon in the future. A peaceful solution with the
Palestinians would not only prevent Israel from facing an internal threat, it
would also allow Israel to eliminate external threats and normalize relations
with its Arab neighbors. Considering the enmities that exist in the region
between Israel and the Arab world, this proposal would seem fantastical and
far-fetched. However, serious peace negotiations have actually been conducted
between Israel and Syria, and Israel has signaled in the past that it would be
willing to negotiate peace with Hezbollah and Hamas.82
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The final advantage of a single state would be the improvement of Israel’s
standing and image within the international community. Because of its policies
towards the Palestinians, Israel suffers from a very negative image and has
faced various calls for boycotts and divestments from countries around the
world. It has been repeatedly been compared to apartheid South Africa and is
condemned for its perceived over-reliance on violence and military actions- an
accusation often leveled by Israelis themselves.83 In a study called the National
Brands Index, Israel placed at the bottom of the list in the public’s perception
of its image. "Israel's brand is by a considerable margin the most negative we
have ever measured in the NBI, and comes at the bottom of the ranking on
almost every question," states report author Simon Anholt.84 And in an
unpublished survey conducted by the European Commission, 59 percent of the
7,500 Europeans polled considered Israel the “top threat to world peace”.85
Many Israelis recognize the fact their state is suffering from a serious image
problem that is growing with each passing day a solution becomes less and less
probable. Even the Israeli government, which implemented the controversial
policies in the first place, has now begun to worry about Israel’s declining
public image and has launched a campaign to paint Israel in a more positive
light.86 But in the present day of countless and instant sources of information,
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spinning or concealing the truth of what is truly happening has become
virtually impossible. Simply relying on a public relations campaign and political
propaganda to shift global opinion will not work; the only successful option
Israel has in improving its image abroad is to take meaningful and concrete
steps in a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians.
Palestinians would also greatly benefit from seeking a one-state solution
despite the difficult compromises needed to be made. For the Palestinians,
compromise has been something they have been forced to make since the
beginning of the conflict. This does not absolve Palestinians or the Palestinian
leadership over the years of making poor or counterproductive decisions; it
simply acknowledges the asymmetrical nature of the conflict, and the reality
that Palestinians as the weaker side have, more often than not, been obligated
to accept or adapt to consequences they had little control over. Palestinians
believe they have already compromised enough agreeing to the creation of a
state on only 22 percent of their historic homeland; therefore, they should not
be asked to cede even more land to Israel’s control. Realistically speaking, the
Palestinians understand what they desire and believe they are entitled to, is
not necessarily what they are going to receive. Palestinians also know that they
are in no position of strength to demand or conduct negotiations on an equal
footing with the Israelis. Therefore, it would be in their best interest to
seriously consider the one-state alternative since Israeli policies have destroyed
any hope for a two-state settlement. Understandably for Palestinians, this
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would be another compromise they would have to endure. But for a number of
reasons this could be the solution bringing the most benefits in the long term.
The first advantage would be the end of the occupation, and by extension
the oppression, of the Palestinian population. If Israel has no desire to
relinquish the land or grant Palestinians the independent state they desire,
then the only remaining option would be to grant Palestinians citizenship and
incorporate them into the political system. Palestinians are clearly aware
incessant settlement activity would mean an independent state is no longer a
feasible option. Any state created under the present circumstances would be
nothing more than a non-contiguous, potentially unstable entity which would
be dwarfed by a much more powerful and advanced neighboring Israel.
Furthermore, past Israeli proposals of an independent Palestinian state would
have actually meant giving up more land than what Palestinians already
possessed. The prevailing argument among many Israeli leaders has been there
are “no partners for peace” on the Palestinian side, and that Palestinians have
rejected generous Israeli proposals in the past - namely at Camp David in
2000. However, this argument has been debunked as myth by various
independent, as well as Israeli observers, who were present at the summit and
concluded that Israel never attended seeking any sort of compromise, rather
they were looking for Palestinian concessions. .87
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Abandoning the idea of an independent Palestinian state and demanding
equal rights would place the onus of negotiating a just and final solution
squarely on the shoulders of the Israeli state. A scenario which would leave the
Israelis with the choices of withdrawing to the 1967 borders, committing ethnic
cleansing or mass expulsion against the Palestinians, or maintaining the status
quo of an apartheid-like system in the occupied territories- all options Israel is
either unwilling or unable to pursue. What would benefit Palestinians most in
this situation would be the demand for full democracy, even it means the end
of Palestinian national aspirations; a likely predicament that has not escaped
the attention of many Israelis. As former prime minister Ehud Olmert states,
"More and more Palestinians are uninterested in a negotiated, two-state
solution, because they want to change the essence of the conflict from an
Algerian paradigm to a South African one. From a struggle against
`occupation,' in their parlance, to a struggle for one-man-one-vote. That is, of
course, a much cleaner struggle, a much more popular struggle - and
ultimately a much more powerful one.”89
The second advantage of a one-state solution for Palestinians is not
necessarily an advantage per se; it is actually the realization that an
independent Palestinian state is not only unlikely to happen, but if it does
happen, the state Palestinians create would not really be a state at all. In other
words, Palestinians can turn a negative reality by using Israel’s destructive
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policies to create potential advantages by dropping the impractical plan of
independent statehood in favor of opting for a one-state solution. As discussed
in the previous chapters, Israel has no true intention of allowing the creation of
a Palestinian state, and if it does allow a state to be formed then Israel would
surely do everything it can to have as much control as possible over the future
Palestinian state. Israeli officials have clearly stated in the past that any future
Palestinian state would have to accept being demilitarized and accept Israel’s
control over its airspace and borders.90 UCLA professor Saree Makdisi believes
a two-state solution under this sort of scenario would be impossible due to the
“grossly” unequal status of the two sides. "If a two-state solution were to be
passed, the only Palestinian state Israel would approve of is a Palestinian
nation that is stripped of any means of self-defense and territorial defenses," he
said. "A state like that would look more or less like the present reality [of
Palestine]."91 A non- contiguous Palestinian state stripped of its own defenses
and not in control of its own borders not only hampers the state’s ability to
properly function when it came to matters of security, it would also potentially
stunt any independent economic growth since imports and exports would most
likely be monitored and approved by the Israeli government.
In recent months, Palestinian leaders have begun taking unilateral steps
to declaring independent statehood, culminating in the September 2011 United
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Nations bid to create a Palestinian state. Though support for a Palestinian state
drew support from nations and peoples around the world, the bid for UN
membership will not bring any concrete changes for Palestinians and their
desire for independent statehood. Israel was vehemently opposed to the
Palestinian bid and warned of severe repercussions, while the United States
has promised to use its Security Council veto to thwart any vote concerning the
issue.92 Since application of the resolution requires Security Council approval,
the vote essentially is nothing more than a symbolic gesture which brings no
practical effects for a resolution to the conflict. A legal opinion issued by Senior
Research Fellow at Oxford University Guy S. Goodwin-Gill explains the bid for
statehood by stating the following:
Until such a time as a final settlement is agreed, the putative State of
Palestine will have no territory over which it exercises effective sovereignty, its
borders will be indeterminate or disputed, its population, actual and potential,
undetermined and many of them continuing to live under occupation or in
States of refuge. While it may be an observer State in the United Nations, it will
fall short of meeting the internationally agreed criteria of statehood, with
serious implications for Palestinians at large, particularly as concerns the
popular representation of those not currently present in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory.
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In fact, there is the possibility the bid could turn out to
counterproductive for Palestinians, because Israel, and to a certain extent the
United States, would use the vote as an excuse to take even harsher punitive
measures to punish Palestinians. Almost immediately following Palestine’s
successful bid to join UNESCO, Israel accelerated construction of 2000 Jewish
homes in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and imposed a temporary halt
on the transfer of tax revenues which it collects on behalf of the Palestinian
Authority.93 Furthermore, a Palestinian push for a two-state solution based on
the assumption a bid for statehood would force the Israelis into meaningful
negotiations is not only naïve it is also untrue. Realistically, Israel can adopt
and initiate any policy or decision it desires because the balance of power is
heavily skewed in its favor and it benefits from the military, political, and
economic protection of the United States. Gidi Grinstein, a member of Ehud
Barak's negotiating team at Camp David in 2000, spelled out the strategic
benefits of Palestinian statehood for Israel when he stated, "A declaration of a
Palestinian state in September includes the possibility of a diplomatic
breakthrough as well as significant advantages for Israel. The establishment of
such a state will help anchor the principle of two states for two peoples, shape
the permanent situation with Israel controlling the security assets and the new
state's surroundings, and diminish the refugee problem by marginalizing
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UNRWA [the United Nations relief and works agency] and limiting refugee
status."94
The final advantage of a one-state solution is the sense of justice it would
bring to Palestinians after many decades of war, dispossession, and
oppression. The Palestinian people existing in the Middle Eastern region are
essentially split into three distinct camps – those living in the West Bank and
Gaza, those Palestinians living in scattered refugee camps around the region,
and finally Palestinians who are citizens in the state of Israel. Each group is
striving to achieve justice in its own way, and each group benefits from the
one-state solution, perhaps not separately, but differently. One must be
realistic, and Palestinians certainly are, that an honest and total remedy to the
historical and present injustices committed against them can and will never be
fully realized. Palestinians displaced during the founding of the state of Israel
in 1948 that have been languishing in refugee camps ever since will not be
allowed to return en masse to the homes they were forced to abandon and
evacuate by Israeli forces. Even if Israelis agreed to allow an independent
Palestinian state to be created, this new Palestinian state would have enough
trouble accommodating the millions already existing in its borders, let alone
millions of returning refugees from other parts of the world. Because of the size
and availability of limited resources, the land simply cannot sustain such a
large population. Though the right of return for Palestinian refugees is
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guaranteed under international law and is considered one of the pillars of
Palestinian nationalist discourse, for many years Palestinian leaders have
understood and begrudgingly accepted a complete right of return will never
materialize. But this does not mean that the rights of those refugees can be
dismissed; neither the state of Israel nor Palestinian leaders can forego the
rightful legal and moral claims the refugees possess. There are no precise
figures for how many Palestinian refugees would actually want to return. Many
of them are already well established, and have built new lives in countries
around the world. An alternative solution would be to allow a limited number of
refugees to return, and for those not wishing to return the option of receiving a
just compensation as affirmed under United Nations resolution 194.95
Professor Virginia Tilley puts forth a solution when she proposes the following:
Establish some parity principle for Palestinian return: for example,
provide for some initial adjustment period to repatriate Palestinian
refugees who wish to return, then, if the state feels compelled to limit
immigration for logistical reasons, insure the annual quotas for
Palestinians at least match annual Jewish immigration numbers.
Second- and third- generation Palestinians not born in the territory
should be held to the same naturalization criteria applied to prospective
Jewish citizens.96
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Proposals like Tilley’s are not only important and beneficial because they
provide a concrete framework; they also address the needs and concerns of
both sides- Palestinian refugees desire for justice, as well as Israeli concerns
about a vast influx of non-Jewish immigrants.
Because so much focus is placed on the plight of Palestinians in the
territories and those in the refugee camps, an oft forgotten or less discussed
subject is that of Israeli Arabs. Arab citizens of Israel face a litany of
discriminatory and exclusionary policies aimed at marginalizing and repressing
the minority that constitutes 20 percent of Israel’s total population. Over the
course of several decades, the state of Israel has enacted a series of laws and
amendments which target Arab Israelis, essentially institutionalizing racism
and discrimination at the very highest levels of government.
In a study conducted by Israel's Courts Administration and the Israel
Bar Association, the results found that, “Arabs are given jail sentences more
often than Jews convicted of the same offenses, and Arabs receive longer
sentences than Jews who are jailed. The study's authors conclude that their
most conspicuous finding is the tendency of Israeli courts to treat Arab
defendants more harshly: When Arabs wind up in court, they are more likely to
be convicted; when convicted, and they are likely to receive a stiffer sentence
than a Jew normally would.”97 Another example of the legal discrimination
Palestinians face in Israel is the 2003 law passed by the Israeli Knesset which
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prohibits Palestinians who marry Israeli citizens from living in Israel.

98

Israeli

Arabs who marry Palestinians from the West Bank or Gaza must either move to
live in the territories, or remain in Israel and live apart from their spouses.
Since the state owns almost all of the land in Israel, Arab Israelis are denied
the right to purchase land and Arab Israeli exemption from military service
deprives them of generous state benefits; benefits afforded to almost all Israeli
Jews since a two year military service is mandatory.99
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Racism towards Arabs in Israel is not only systemic and institutionalized,
it also pervasive among Jewish Israeli attitudes towards their fellow Palestinian
citizens. A report published by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel found
that “Over two-thirds Israeli teen believe Arabs to be less intelligent,
uncultured and violent. Over a third of Israeli teens fear Arabs all together.”
another poll conducted in 2007 found that “fifty percent of Israelis taking part
said they would not live in the same building as Arabs, will not befriend, or let
their children befriend Arabs and would not let Arabs into their homes.101 But
arguably the most incendiary and controversial scheme targeting Israeli Arabs
is the “Populated-Area Exchange Plan” put forth by Israeli Foreign Minister
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Avigdor Lieberman which would see Israel’s Arab population moved to a newly
created Palestinian state in exchange for the evacuation of some Israeli
settlements in the West Bank.102 Israeli Arabs, through no choice of their own,
would be uprooted from their lands and homes, stripped of their Israeli
citizenship, and moved into an uncertain future in an uncertain Palestinian
state.
Segregation, discrimination, and military repression are never the answer
in the long-term because they fail to address the roots of the conflict; they
merely prolong an inevitable clash which is bound to occur in the future. Even
if Israel were to reverse decades of policy and decides to allow the creation of a
Palestinian state it would not necessarily be the most viable option at this
point. Despite the many difficulties, a one-state solution could carry a great
deal more benefit for Israelis and Palestinians than a partitioning of the land- a
fact many Jewish intellectuals recognized very early on. However, there are a
still a variety of issues and problems of a single state that simply cannot be
ignored.
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Difficulties of the One-State Solution
Because a two-state solution is no longer a practical or viable option to
ending the conflict, this does not necessarily indicate a single state can be
created without overcoming a variety of issues and problems. The distinct
historical and religious narratives coupled with political and geographic
realities will render any solution, whether it is one or two states, a daunting
and time consuming undertaking. There are, however, a series of particular
problems that must be addressed concerning the one state solution.
First, the one state solution, at the present time, only garners minor
support among both Israelis and Palestinians. The majority of Israelis and
Palestinians still believe that two independent states is the most appealing
option. But among intellectuals, academics, and left wing observers having one
state is the only remaining alternative offering the most realistic, as well as
democratic solution. For Israelis, lack of support for a one state solution is
based primarily on the view that a single state would mean the end of Israel as
a Jewish state and the death of Zionism as a political ideology.103 While
Palestinians believe adopting the one state solution would spell the end of
Palestinian national aspirations and the dream of a sovereign state. While both
arguments are clearly valid, this has not stopped the growing emergence of
support for the one state solution.
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Though Israelis view a single state with antipathy, there are a growing
number of Jewish voices who support the proposal not only in practical terms,
but on deeply held principles of justice and equality. Israeli politicians like
Meron Benvinisti and peace activists like Haim Hanegbi have both arrived at
the conclusion, albeit for different reasons, that unless Israel adopts the one
state solution, then Israel’s future is in serious peril. Both Benivinsti and
Hanegbi agree Israel’s future is not in jeopardy because of Palestinian violence
or resistance, but through Israel’s own policies which have created a state that
relies on militarism, racism, and oppression to achieve its Zionist ideological
goals.104 For individuals like Benvinisti and Hanegbi, the real battle is not only
for Israel’s physical existence, it is also for Israel’s soul and character as a
nation. Many Israelis have painfully and begrudgingly come to realize that
Zionism as an ethno-religious movement is no longer sustainable or applicable
in a modern world dominated by diverse, multi-cultural nations states. The
recognition Western liberal democracies have indeed provided a safe and stable
environment for Jews invalidates the claim Israel needs to be a predominately
and exclusively Jewish state to act as a sanctuary for Jews worldwide.
Avraham Burg, former Knesset speaker and former head of the Jewish Agency
says "to define the State of Israel as a Jewish state is the key to its end. A
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Jewish state is explosive. It is dynamite… the strategic mistake of Zionism was
to annul the alternatives. Israeliness has only body; it doesn't have soul."105
Palestinians also have serious reservations about adopting a one-state
solution since it would be viewed as capitulation or a national betrayal to
become citizens of a state which has dispossessed and oppressed them for
decades. Obviously, the idea of an independent Palestinian state will have to be
set aside and Palestinian self-determination subordinated. Palestinians are well
aware of the second-class status Israeli Arabs face and will expect the same
sort of treatment- simply trading one form of discrimination and oppression for
another. However, despite any misgivings they may possess Palestinians have
come to acknowledge the pragmatic reality a two-state solution is no longer in
the cards. Israeli policies, the failure of the peace process, and the
inadequacies of the Palestinian government have pushed more and more
Palestinians to support a one-state solution. Polls among Palestinian residents
of the West Bank and Gaza show a marked increase in their support of a single
state model, especially because of Palestinian failure to halt settlement
activity.106
There is also a growing sentiment among members of the Palestinian
Authority that abandoning the two-state solution is becoming necessary. A
report written by Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erakat cites several different
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methods and options that can be taken by Palestinians “to reduce damage,
unify our discourse and preserve all our rights on grounds of the international
law and legitimacy as well as exercise pressure on the Israeli government by
exposing its policies and positions through all relevant international and
regional organizations.”107 Erakat’s recommendations include various forms of
non-violent resistance, nullifying the Oslo Accords, dissolving the Palestinian
Authority, and finally abandoning the two-state option in favor of a single state
for both Israelis and Palestinians.108 Some have argued official Palestinian
adoption of the single state is nothing more than political leveraging intent on
forcing Israel to withdraw to the 1967 borders and initiate the creation of an
independent Palestinian state. Virginia Tilley believes this to be the case when
she states, “some elements have much to lose from a multi-ethnic state; not
least, the old-guard Palestinian elite and their clients in the PA would lose the
fat sinecures of their much-abused positions.”109 Whether Palestinian leaders
are seriously considering the proposal or simply using it as a political ploy, a
one-state solution appears to be the only option remaining.
A second argument against the one-state solution is the belief that
inherent Arab hostility towards Jews and Israelis will prevent any sort of
peaceful coexistence between the two peoples. Israelis view their state as a tiny,
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segregated peace seeking entity surrounded by a sea of hostile, blood-thirsty
Arab nations’ intent on bringing about its imminent destruction. Aside from the
obvious racial stereotyping, this assertion has little validity for a number of
reasons.
First, Palestinians bear animosity towards Israelis considering the
history of oppression and dispossession Palestinians experienced at the hands
of Israelis. Unlike the old, nefarious anti-Semitism which existed in Western
Europe and elsewhere, the Middle East does not have a history of hatred
towards Jews. Negative Arab reactions are not carried out towards Israelis
simply because they are Jews. Because of Israel’s insistence on being
recognized and referred to as the “Jewish state”, the conflict thus becomes
between “Jews and Arabs” not “Israelis and Arabs”, simply by the fact it is how
Israelis refer to themselves. If, for example, the occupiers had referred to
themselves as “Catholics”, then the enemy would be known as the “Catholics”.
This is not to deny genuine anti-Semitism or anti-Jewish sentiments exist in
the Arab world, it merely points out the semantics of the terminology in
relation to the conflict. The current attitudes towards Israelis and Jews in Arab
countries are colored mainly through the prism of Palestinian maltreatment at
the hands of Israeli authorities. The majority of Palestinians still believes and
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accepts that negotiations, not violence, will ultimately bring about a peaceful
and final resolution.110
Secondly, the Arabs in Israel serve as an example of what a future Israeli
state may entail if citizenship is granted to Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza. Though undeniably marginalized and discriminated against, Arab
Israelis have adopted a strained, yet tolerated, existence with their fellow
Jewish citizens- a fact which proves affording individuals or groups the basic
minimum of human and political rights will inevitably lead to more peace and
stability.
Third, the example of liberal Western democracies where Jews, Arabs,
and Muslims peacefully coexist proves hatred can certainly have a political
nature, and does not necessarily have to include racial or religious undertones.
Because of the political and economic equality guaranteed under the state in a
liberal democracy, each ethnic and religious group is allowed to pursue its own
agenda without fear of persecution or discrimination. Most opposition to the
one-state solution would most likely come from Israeli and Palestinian religious
zealots, who would oppose any sort of compromise based on their respective
religious traditions and narratives. However, it is possible to remedy this issue
by ensuring the state has a strict and defined separation between church and
state. There is absolutely nothing wrong with the official recognition of religious
and linguistic traditions within a constitution; however, in the interest of law
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and equality the state must be the ultimate authority on issues of general
national concern.
Finally, various Arab states like Egypt and Jordan have already signed
peace agreements with Israel, and those states that have not, have signaled a
willingness to do so with full normalization of relations between the Arab states
and Israel.111 In fact, the Arab states have been yearning for a peace with Israel
for quite a while. The ongoing security problems, the hampering of business
and trade throughout the region, the radicalization of their own populations,
and the instability large numbers of Palestinian refugees create are some of the
reasons why the Arab world is desperate for an end to the Arab-Israeli
conflict.112 Even if the Arab state did actually entertain the idea of
confrontation with Israel, it would certainly be a losing proposition. Israel
enjoys a vast military superiority over any and all the Arab states, and also
possesses a powerful alliance with the United States which would render
military action against Israel out of the question.
The final problem of a one-state solution centers on the argument that is
racist to deny Jews the right of self-determination as a distinct religious and
ethnic group. Critics maintain that Jews possess an inherent right to rule
themselves in their professed ancestral homeland free from anti-Semitism and
persecution they might face elsewhere. Because of the shameful and criminal
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treatment that Jews have historically suffered throughout history, one can
certainly understand the reasoning behind such fears. However, the proposal
put forth of a one-state solution does not deny Jews have a right to selfdetermination or safety from persecution; it simply rejects the notion of an
ethno-centric Jewish state. Adopting the one-state solution does not mean the
end of Jewish presence in Israel or the abandonment of Jewish connection to
the land. But what a single state does is dismantle the system of privilege one
ethnic group enjoys over the other and demands equal rights be given to
Palestinians.
As discussed in the previous chapters, Israel now faces a serious
conundrum since it has to choose between being Jewish, being a state, and
being democratic; at any given moment it can only have two of three options, it
simply cannot have all three. An issue that was realized very early on by many
prominent Jews like Rabbi Judah Magnes, Martin Buber, Hannah Arendt, and
Albert Einstein - who supported a national homeland for Jews in Palestine, yet
rejected any sort of ethnic nationalism. In an article written the same month
Israel declared independence, Arendt made her position very clear on the need
for Jewish-Arab cooperation when she states, “The idea of Arab-Jewish
cooperation, though never realized on any scale and today seemingly farther off
than ever, is not an idealistic day dream but a sober statement of the fact that
without it the whole Jewish venture in Palestine is doomed.”113 And in a speech
given in 1938, Albert Einstein echoes Arendt’s statement on the dangers of
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Zionist exclusivity when he says, “I should much rather see reasonable
agreement with the Arabs on the basis of living together in peace than the
creation of a Jewish state…the essential nature of Judaism resists the idea of a
Jewish state with borders, an army, and a measure of temporal power….I am
afraid of the inner damage Judaism will sustain – especially from the
development of a narrow nationalism within our own ranks.”114 What is
remarkable about the comments made by Arendt and Einstein is not only did
they see the inherent problems with ethno-centric and religious ideologies like
Zionism; they also had the prescience to recognize partition of the land into two
states was an impending disaster which would lead to a violent and seemingly
unending conflict between Jews and Arabs.
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Conclusion
For an area constituting such a small such a percentage of the earth’s
people and land, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict certainly casts one of the
largest shadows in present day global politics. The confluence of various
histories, languages, cultures, and religions creates such a highly charged
environment that, oftentimes, the necessity for a practical resolution becomes
eclipsed by emotional narratives and poisonous rhetoric. A single state solution
does not guarantee a sufficient end to the conflict which would ultimately
satisfy both parties, but what it does offer is the opportunity for a constructive,
alternative vision to the failure of the already doomed two-state settlement. The
Israeli-Palestinian conflict has once again demonstrated that security can never
be achieved through violence and repression. Lasting peace can ultimately be
realized only through negotiation and dialogue, and this conflict is no different.
Partition and segregation has proved to be an ineffective method thus far;
therefore, the time has come to begin accepting a single state based on true
democratic values and principles remains the only viable option. Admittedly,
this will be a long and arduous process requiring great compromise from both
sides. Israelis will have to relinquish the Zionist dream of a state excluding
non-Jews, and Palestinians will have to realize their dream of independent
statehood is no longer attainable. The fact is Israelis and Palestinians have
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already been living in a single state since 1967 rendering the two peoples
virtually inseparable; nothing short of genocide and ethnic cleansing on the
part of the Israelis can change this actuality.
Throughout history, every instance of wishing to inspire change has
begun with the voices of the few courageous individuals daring to challenge the
entrenched narratives and attempting to reimagine the direction of their
communities. For those Israelis and Palestinians envisioning a better future,
the one-state solution is the lone solution remaining which brings about a just,
peaceful, and pragmatic end to the conflict. Unfortunately, for this generation
of Israelis and Palestinians this might have come a little too late. But this
proposal has never been about the present; it has always been about the
future. As Israeli peace activist Miko Peled rightly states, “The era of cosmetic
changes together with the two-state solution is gone forever. Only full equal
rights for both peoples in their historic homeland will bring an end to this
conflict. And while there are those who will claim that this is a naïve dream
and will never become a reality, we could do well to remember that the success
of any struggle depends on the determination of its leaders and the clarity of its
purpose, not the doubts of its naysayers.”115 Hopefully, both Israelis and
Palestinians will reach the same conclusion sooner rather than later.
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